Norms and values constitute the scaffolding of social life, organizing expectations, guiding behavior, and enabling coordinated action across diverse contexts. Distinct yet interdependent, formal rules (laws, regulations, organizational bylaws) and informal rules (customs, conventions, social norms) together shape how individuals interpret situations and make choices. This article examines theoretical perspectives on norms and values, differentiates formal and informal rules of social behavior, and explores their interaction, stability, and change. Emphasis is placed on contemporary insights into norm dynamics and on classical institutional understandings of how rules—formal and informal—facilitate collective action and social order (Ostrom, 1990; Andrighetto et al., 2024).
Theoretical foundations: institutions, norms, and values
Institutions are commonly defined as the rules of the game in a society—both formal (codified) and informal (socially enforced)—that structure human interaction (Ostrom, 1990). Within this framework, values represent broader cultural commitments or ideals (what a society considers desirable), while norms are more specific prescriptions or proscriptions about behavior in particular contexts. Norms operate through shared expectations and conditional preferences: individuals comply because they expect others to comply and because they anticipate social consequences for deviation (Andrighetto et al., 2024). This relational logic distinguishes norms from mere habits or individual preferences and highlights their emergent, collective character.
Elinor Ostrom’s institutionalist approach emphasizes that rules—formal or informal—are mechanisms to coordinate action and solve collective-action problems (Ostrom, 1990). Ostrom’s empirical and theoretical work demonstrates that communities can and often do develop locally embedded arrangements, combining formal agreements and normative sanctions, to manage shared resources and sustain cooperation. Contemporary research on social norms complements this perspective by unpacking micro-mechanisms of norm emergence, maintenance, and change, and by analyzing when norms are robust or susceptible to rapid transformation (Andrighetto et al., 2024).
Formal rules: codified governance and instrumental enforcement
Formal rules are explicit, codified prescriptions typically promulgated by recognized authorities (states, organizations, courts). They rely on clear procedures for enactment, objective standards of compliance, and formal enforcement mechanisms—fines, imprisonment, official sanctions, or organizational penalties. Formal rules are designed for clarity, universality, and predictability; their legitimacy is often grounded in procedural rationality or democratic authorization.
From a functional perspective, formal rules reduce uncertainty by standardizing behavior, lowering transaction costs associated with monitoring and bargaining, and providing mechanisms for dispute resolution. However, formal rules also face limitations. Implementation and enforcement are contingent on institutional capacity and legitimacy; in contexts of weak governance, formal rules may be hollow or unevenly applied. Moreover, formal rules can be blind to local social contexts: without resonance with prevailing values and normative expectations, legal provisions may fail to alter practice or may generate formal compliance that masks persistent informal violations.
Ostrom’s analysis underscores that formal arrangements often succeed when they are congruent with local norms and when design principles allow communities to manage enforcement and adaptation locally (Ostrom, 1990). Thus, the efficacy of formal rules frequently depends on their alignment with the informal normative ecosystem in which they operate.
Informal rules: normative expectations, sanctioning, and internalization
Informal rules are unwritten, socially enforced expectations that regulate everyday behavior. They range from highly consequential community norms (e.g., reciprocity in small-scale societies) to subtle etiquette that facilitates social interaction. Informal rules are maintained by social mechanisms—esteem, shame, ostracism, reciprocity and reputational repercussions—rather than formal legal penalties.
A key characteristic of informal norms is their conditional nature: individuals’ motivations to comply depend upon empirical expectations (beliefs about what others do) and normative expectations (beliefs about what others think one ought to do). Where these expectations are widely shared and visible, norms can exert powerful behavioral influence even in the absence of formal enforcement. Conversely, when expectations diverge or are uncertain, norms may be weak or contested.
Recent scholarship has emphasized the dynamic nature of norms: they can emerge, endure, fracture, or shift in response to social, technological, and environmental pressures (Andrighetto et al., 2024). Norm change can be gradual or abrupt, and it often involves interactions between belief dynamics, social networks, and institutional signals. Informal rules are therefore not static cultural artifacts but adaptive mechanisms that respond to evolving collective interests and constraints.
Interaction between formal and informal rules: complementarity and contestation
The relationship between formal and informal rules is complex and multifaceted. Several interaction patterns recur in empirical and theoretical accounts: complementarity, substitution, and contestation.
Complementarity occurs when formal rules and informal norms reinforce one another. Legal prohibition against corruption, for instance, is more effective where an informal norm stigmatizes corrupt behavior; conversely, robust informal norms can reduce the need for costly formal enforcement (Ostrom, 1990). When formal institutions recognize and incorporate customary practices—through polycentric governance or participatory rule-making—the resultant arrangements often yield higher compliance and adaptive capacity.
Substitution arises when informal institutions compensate for weak formal governance. Communities may rely on customary norms and reciprocal relationships to resolve disputes and regulate resource use when state capacity is limited. However, substitution can generate exclusivity or inequality if informal networks privilege particular groups.
Contestation and conflict emerge when formal rules and informal norms diverge—when laws seek to alter deeply held normative practices, or when new formal regulations threaten established social arrangements. In such cases, compliance may be superficial, enforcement costly, and social friction intense. Andrighetto et al. (2024) highlight that normative systems can both enable and resist engineered change; policy interventions that ignore belief structures and expectation dynamics risk backfire or limited effects.
Mechanisms of stability and change
Understanding why some norms persist and others shift requires attention to enforcement mechanisms, network structures, and ecological contingencies. Norm stability is often sustained by dense social networks that amplify reputational consequences, by internalization processes where norms become part of an individual’s identity, and by alignment with material interests. Conversely, norm change may be precipitated by exogenous shocks (economic crises, pandemics), changes in the distribution of incentives, shifts in salient beliefs, or the emergence of influential role models and institutions that alter expectations.
Importantly, the literature emphasizes that interventions aimed at norm change must address both informational and normative dimensions: altering beliefs about what others do (descriptive norms) and what others approve of (injunctive norms) simultaneously. The theme issue curated by Andrighetto and colleagues demonstrates that multi-method, interdisciplinary approaches—combining experiments, computational modelling, and ethnographic work—offer promising pathways to diagnose norm strength and to design context-sensitive interventions (Andrighetto et al., 2024).
Policy implications and practical considerations
For policymakers and practitioners seeking to harness or reform normative systems, several implications follow. First, diagnostic work is essential: identifying the empirical and normative expectations that sustain behavior clarifies entry points for intervention. Second, legal reform is not a panacea; formal rules should seek congruence with informal norms where possible, and should be accompanied by measures that shift expectations (public information campaigns, exemplar behavior by leaders, network interventions). Third, in contexts of weak formal governance, strengthening local institutions and supporting community-based enforcement mechanisms can yield durable outcomes (Ostrom, 1990).
Finally, ethical considerations matter. Efforts to engineer norm change must be sensitive to power asymmetries and the risk of unintended consequences: norms can protect vulnerable populations as well as reproduce exclusion. Interventions should therefore be participatory, evidence-based, and adaptive, with careful monitoring of downstream effects (Andrighetto et al., 2024).
Conclusion
Norms and values—embodied as informal and formal rules—are foundational to social order and collective action. Classical institutional analysis clarifies how rules reduce uncertainty and enable cooperation, while recent interdisciplinary work illuminates the micro-dynamics of norm emergence and change. Effective governance requires recognizing the complementarity of formal and informal systems: laws are more effective when they resonate with normative expectations, and norms are more resilient when supported by legitimate institutions. Future research and policy should continue to integrate theoretical insights with empirical diagnostics to design interventions that are contextually grounded, ethically attentive, and empirically effective.
References
- Andrighetto, G., Gavrilets, S., Gelfand, M. J., Mace, R., & Vriens, E. (2024). Social norm change: drivers and consequences. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 379(1897), Article 20230023.
- Ostrom, E. (1990). Governing the commons: The evolution of institutions for collective action. Cambridge University Press.
